
























































Over the past decade, following the 
economic crisis of 2008, protest waves 
have been flowing the streets articu-
lating citizens' discontent, opposing 
austerity measures, blaming national 
governments for political unresponsive-
ness, and calling for democratic renewal 
(Beissinger and Sasse 2014; Della Porta 
2015; Grasso and Giugni 2016). Citi-
zens' radical reactions were not directly 
prompted by crisis itself, but rather by 
governmental responses to the crisis 
as the implemented austerity measures 
only perpetuated economic uncertain-
ty (Bermeo and Bartels 2014). Auster-
ity measures imposed by the European 
Union (EU) to some of the member 
states and candidate countries served as 
a convergent external force which, once 
implemented in a particular country, led 
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Abstract Analyses of protest dynamics in Croatia are rare, partially because until 
know it was not possible to view them systematically. Relying on the newly colle-
cted protest event data 2000-2017, this paper describes the main trends and dyna-
mics of protest activities in Croatia in the observed period. it re-examines Beissin-
ger and sasse's claim about the absence of austerity related protests in Croatia after 
2008. The analysis shows that though protests directly addressing austerity were 
relatively scarce, when the protest set is expanded to protests which demanded 
free public education, advocated labour rights, and fought for the right to the city, 
the prevailing thesis about "quietism" in Croatia can be challenged. The paper aims 
to relate some of the observed protest dynamics to Kerbo's distinction between 
movements of crisis and movements of affluence. Focusing on the period between 
the student movement in 2008 until Facebook protests in 2011, it shows that the 
student movement and "The Right to the City" movement preceded Facebook pro-
tests in formulating and expressing socio-economic grievances and articulated an-
ti-systemic sentiment. due to their strong organizational structure, resources and 
activists' "know-how", these movements resemble Kerbo's movements of affluence. 
on the other hand, the 2011 Facebook protests lacked organizational structure and 
continuous engagement and can be seen as movements of crisis.
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to different outcomes in terms of pace of 
economic recovery, socio-economic sit-
uation in general, but also to the specific 
political participation patterns at aggre-
gate level (Della Porta 2017).
The scholars assumed that anti-aus-
terity protests would be more frequent 
and bigger in size when compared to 
the protests in the age of relatively stable 
political and economic periods. It was 
expected that the protesters' demands 
would address specific austerity meas-
ures such as changes in employment 
legislation, social services, pensions and 
education (Cisar and Navratil 2016). 
Greek and Spanish, Portuguese, Icelan-
dic, and even Italian and Irish experi-
ence confirmed these expectations (Vo-
giatzoglou, Romanos, Fernandes, An-
dretta and O'Connor 2017). However, 
when compared to each other, countries 
such as Spain or Greece have seen sig-
nificantly stronger waves of contention 
than Portugal or Italy which introduced 
austerity measures as well. The scarce lit-
erature on the anti-austerity protests in 
Central and Eastern Europe (Beissinger 
and Sasse 2014; Cisar and Navratil 2016) 
came to a similar conclusion: no unique 
pattern of protest participation across 
the European countries hit by the crisis 
has been observed.
In the evening of December 5, 2008, 
approximately 10,000 people protested 
in different Croatian cities.1 Shouting 
"Tighten your belt, you gang of thieves" 
they were replying to the statement of the 
then Prime Minister, Ivo Sanader, who 
claimed that an economic crisis would 
not hit Croatia, but advised citizens to 




2 In Croatian, the expression "Stegnite 
remen" (tighten your belt) is used figura-
tively to advise someone to cut their spen-
ding to prevent financial difficulties.
ing holiday season.3 When in autumn of 
2012 the social-democrat government 
decided to cancel collective agreements 
in the public sector, the Prime Minis-
ter, Zoran Milanović, reminded citizens 
that the Government had made "some 
promises" towards the EU and that this 
decision was the only way to continue 
with fiscal consolidation. Only around 
5,000 protesters rebelled against the 
introduced policy. That number seems 
marginal if noted that the said decision 
targeted benefits of over 180,000 pub-
lic sector workers and, consequently, 
impacted their households.4 Based on 
similar newspaper reports, Croatia was 
described in the literature (Beissinger 
and Sasse 2014) as one of the most no-
table exceptions from the assumption 
that numerous and sizable anti-austerity 
protests were going to happen if a coun-
try went into recession. However, the 
Croatian cycle of anti-austerity protests 
has not been studied in depth. Beissing-
er and Sasse (2014) assume that Croa-
tian citizens remained relatively calm 
and offered little to no resistance to the 
introduction of austerity measures but 
offer no conclusive answers to the ques-
tion why an austerity-fuelled cycle of 
contention did not occur as it did else-
where. This paper explores this ques-
tion by analysing new data from 2000 to 
2017 collected via protest event analysis 
(PEA hereafter) within the "Disobedi-
ent Democracy: A Comparative Analy-







5 "Disobedient Democracy" is a compara-
tive research project exploring how protest 
politics advances democracy, implemented 
by the Faculty of Political Science of the 
University of Zagreb, financed by the Swiss 
National Science Foundation under the ini-
























































The contribution to the literature is 
twofold. First, it gives an extensive over-
view of protest activities in Croatia in the 
last two decades and shows that national 
varieties of capitalism influence patterns 
of protest participation in a given coun-
try. Second, by analysing protests in the 
period after the economic crisis, the pa-
per shows that protests directly address-
ing specific austerity measures were in-
deed relatively scarce and reactive. How-
ever, when these events are linked to 
numerous other protests that demanded 
free public education, advocated labour 
rights, and fought for the right to the city 
– the notion of "quietism" dominating 
the mainstream political discourse can 
be challenged. Furthermore, the paper 
aims to relate some of the observed pro-
test dynamics to Kerbo's (1982) distinc-
tion between movements of crisis and 
movements of affluence by focusing on 
the period between the student move-
ment in 2008 until Facebook protests in 
2011. The student movement and "The 
Right to the City" movement preceded 
Facebook protests in formulating and 
expressing socio-economic grievances 
and articulated anti-systemic sentiment. 
Due to their organizational structure 
and resources they resemble Kerbo's 
movements of affluence, while the 2011 
Facebook protests lacked organizational 
structure and continuous engagement 
and, in that sense, can be seen as corre-
sponding to movements of crisis.
This paper is structured as follows. As 
the data on protest activities in Croa-
tia has not been collected thus far, the 
data collection and the method used for 
analysis are presented first. The paper is 
based on novel data, which is used to an-
alyse the longitudinal evolution of pro-
tests, and to apprehend particular fea-
tures of protest activity in the Croatian 
context. The following section presents 
Eastern Europe" (PROMYS), and led by the 
principal investigator, Danijela Dolenec.
theoretical explanations that link the 
phenomenon of protest participation to 
cycles of economic recession. After that 
it gives an overview of the political and 
economic context in Croatia from the 
early 1990s until the onset of the eco-
nomic crisis. Finally, the results of PEA 
are discussed.
Protest Event Analysis
Data used in this paper has been collect-
ed via PEA within the "Disobedient De-
mocracy" project. For the Croatian case, 
data has been gathered in late 2017 and 
2018 at the Faculty of Political Science of 
the University of Zagreb.6
In the last three decades PEA has be-
come one of the most important meth-
ods in social movement studies. The 
"eventful turn" (Tarrow 2012) in social 
sciences has brought the focus back to 
the event as a theoretically relevant con-
cept. No matter the specific method or 
technique applied, qualitative or quanti-
tative, PEA represents a helpful tool in 
systematic gathering and organization 
of the data and remains central to the 
study of protest mobilization (Hutter 
2014; Koopmans and Rucht 2002).
PEA is a type of content analysis that 
assesses the features of protests across 
space and over time and is particular-
ly useful for analysing the longitudinal 
evolution of protests. It easily identifies 
protest campaigns spanning over cer-
tain time periods and/or taking place 
at different locations (Hutter 2014). 
PEA helps to achieve historically and 
6 The entire comparative dataset has been 
composed in 2019. It contains data collected 
during 2017 and 2018 for protest events in 
2000 – 2017. Groups of researchers from 
the Faculty of Political Science of the Uni-
versity of Zagreb, Complutense University 
of Madrid, Nova University of Lisbon and 
Institute for Philosophy and Social The-
ory of the University of Belgrade collected 


























comparatively relevant insights regard-
ing social movement dynamics (Hutter 
2014; Earl et al. 2004). As with almost 
any other method of social research, two 
main shortcomings stem from sources 
of bias in data collection (Tilly 2002 and 
Hutter 2014). First, the selection bias, 
meaning that the protest events report-
ed in the news might not be representa-
tive of the amount of protests that took 
place in reality (Oliver and Maney 2000; 
Earl et al. 2004; Ortiz et al. 2005; Hut-
ter 2014). Second, the description bias, 
meaning that for various reasons news 
reports can contain mistaken, imprecise 
or incomplete descriptions of an event 
(Ortiz et al. 2005; Tilly 2002).
The main objective of the data collec-
tion was to correctly identify all cases of 
protest events covered in the national 
daily newspapers selected for analysis, 
and to code the available information 
reported on each identified event. News-
paper items were used as factual sources 
meaning that PEA relies on newspaper 
data as an imperfect, but, in the scarcity 
of alternative sources apt for compara-
tive research (Koopmans 1995 in Krie-
si et al. 1995), the best available source 
of information. As other researchers 
working with the newspaper data, we 
are aware of the risk of selection in news 
coverage. However, it is assumed that the 
pattern of selection of reported events is 
relatively stable across time and issues, 
and that the number of reported events 
tracks real changes of protest activities 
in the population of actual events (Oli-
ver and Maney 2000). Earl et al. (2004) 
identify three sets of factors predicting 
the selection bias: first, larger and more 
violent protests are more likely to be 
covered in the media; second, local and 
leftist newspapers are going to be less se-
lective in covering protests than nation-
al and conservative ones; third, protests 
addressing issues of general relevance 
are more likely to be covered than those 
dealing with specific demands. To tackle 
the bias, but also to enable cross-coun-
try comparisons, two quality national 
daily newspapers of different ideological 
stance were used as data sources in each 
country. In the case of Croatia, Jutarnji 
list and Večernji list were used. To avoid 
additional selection, all editions from 
January 1st, 2000 until December 31st, 
2017 have been used for the analysis. 
The coders performed traditional event 
coding since the selected newspapers 
are published in various languages, and 
since some of them never digitalized 
their archives.7 The coding consisted of 
two consecutive phases: first, the iden-
tification of protest events, and second, 
their classification based on selected 
attributes such as duration, type, or-
ganizers, participants etc. (Makarov et 
al. 2016). All coders were BA and MA 
students of political science and sociolo-
gy with previous theoretical knowledge 
of contentious politics, native Croatian 
speakers with a professional command 
of English. The identification process 
was limited to events that took place 
within the selected country, and events 
that occurred in other countries and 
were reported on in national newspa-
pers were not taken into account.
As the nature of protest events signifi-
cantly varies, particularly across differ-
ent national contexts, no strict defini-
tion of a protest event was provided to 
7 The protocol for entering data on protest 
events was located online, at http://dis-
dem.org, and could be accessed through 
an account. The interface directed the 
coders, reducing space for error. Coders 
were able to simultaneously input data, 
without having to save the local version of 
their dataset, which enabled them to have 
only one version of the dataset in every 
time point. Also, team leaders who super-
vised data collection and coding were able 
to review the data in real time. Given that 
data was collected simultaneously at seve-
ral locations, these features of the protocol 
























































the coders. The coders were instructed 
to identify all events that made politi-
cal claims in public, on behalf of an in-
dividual or a collective. Also, a protest 
event was considered to be a meaningful 
unit, tied together by a shared objective, 
which means it could span across sever-
al locations and over time. To provide 
better guidance for the identification 
process, we listed different forms of 
protest strategies and methods, ranging 
from "traditional" protest strategies such 
as marches, demonstrations and strikes, 
to newer strategies e.g. acampadas. The 
list was adapted according to PEA code-
books from earlier studies.8
Who Participates in the 
Austerity Fuelled Cycle of 
Contention and Why?
What is known from the literature on 
protest participation, is mostly based 
on studies focusing on movements of 
affluence (Kerbo 1982) – usually and 
particularly – in "advanced democra-
cies, with expanding welfare provisions" 
(Della Porta 2017: 262). These studies 
showed that the main preconditions 
for protest participation were political 
opportunities and an abundance of re-
sources. Contrarily, Tarrow (1993) used 
Zolberg's (1972) phrase on "moments of 
madness – when all is possible" to in-
troduce the idea that in times of crisis 
the possibility of mobilization increases 
because collective actions unfold when 
changing political opportunities ena-
ble the engagement of actors who lack 
resources on their own (Tarrow 2012). 
Therefore, two approaches are used to 
explain the preconditions for political 
8 The list was designed according to PEA 
codebooks used in several recent research 
projects which aimed to gather PEA data. 
The DisDem research team gratefully 
acknowledges Grzegorz Ekiert and Jan 
Kubik, Mark Beissinger, and Martin Portos 
for providing us with unpublished code-
books they have composed. 
participation. One claims that resources 
matter for any mode of political parti-
cipation, and consequently, for protest 
participation as well (Almond and Ver-
ba 1963; Verba and Nie 1972; Brady et 
al. 1995; Verba et al. 1995; Dalton 1988, 
2008). On the other hand, grievances 
and discontent are used as explanatory 
factors for protest mobilization (Gurr 
1970; Opp 1988). The second line of tho-
ught has been relatively less studied since 
the second half of the twentieth century. 
Emergence of the new social movement 
theory has led to the generally accepted 
idea that economic growth and wealth 
accumulation foster the rise of protests 
addressing non-material issues. Since 
the period of economic growth abruptly 
ended, protests addressing socio-econo-
mic inequality and redistribution have 
been on the rise (Giugni and Grasso 
2016). As theories relying on the role of 
resources do not offer a comprehensive 
explanation for protest participation in 
times of hardship (Galais and Lorenzini 
2017) arguments based on grievances 
are becoming relevant once again with 
researchers aiming to discover to what 
extent the economic hardship inflicted 
on citizens upon the implementation of 
austerity measures post-2008 has incre-
ased protest participation.
The respective relevance of these theo-
ries, as well as their interaction, has been 
tested by analysing the genesis and back-
ground of social responses to the eco-
nomic crisis. However, the knowledge 
obtained is based almost exclusively on 
case studies of countries of southern Eu-
rozone periphery. They tested the afore-
mentioned theories empirically but have 
not reached a conclusive answer, show-
ing that different patterns were observed 
in specific national contexts (Rüdig and 
Karyotis 2014; Flesher Fominaya 2014; 
Muñoz et al. 2014; Anduiza et al. 2014; 
Accornero and Pinto 2015; Giugni and 

























al. 2017; Galais and Lorenzini 2017; Al-
tiparmakis and Lorenzini 2018). Similar 
processes in other European countries 
have been neglected. The post-socialist 
countries of Central and Eastern Eu-
rope, which are, to a different degree, 
integrated into the EU and, therefore, 
prone to spill over effects, both of crisis 
itself and its political effects, have been 
almost completely left out from the liter-
ature (Beissinger and Sasse 2014).
The contextual characteristics pro-
vide one possible explanation for the 
cross-national variations in protest par-
ticipation. Each country has distinctive 
institutional structures and practices 
shaping people's attitudes and behav-
iour. In social movement literature, the 
political opportunity theory departs 
from the same point. National institu-
tions' specificities are used to explain 
the emergence, form, level, and decline 
of protests (McAdam 1986; Tarrow 
1989; Kriesi et al. 1995; Kriesi 2004; 
Tilly and Tarrow 2006). Koopmans 
(1996) argued that openness of state to 
citizens' demands determines the costs 
of participation and the success of colle-
ctive action. If the state is open towards 
its citizens, the costs are lower and the 
chances that collective action will be su-
ccessful rise. Consequently, if the state 
is more open towards demands, citizens 
will be more willing to participate more, 
as they have opportunities to fulfil their 
interests (Quaranta 2016). The econo-
mic crisis and the democratic crisis it 
fuelled (Della Porta 2017) can be seen as 
an opening in the political opportunity 
structure which enables engagement in 
collective action (McAdam et al. 1996).
Recent comparative studies claim that 
the state of the economy – measured as 
GDP growth, unemployment rate, and 
inflation rate – can serve as a predictor 
for the number of crisis related protests 
in a given country (Vassallo and Ding 
2016). Beissinger and Sasse (2014) argue 
that variables such as GDP growth and 
GDP per capita are negatively associated 
with the number of protests. Unemploy-
ment and inflation rates are positively 
associated with protest, as the loss of a 
job, for instance, brings out strong griev-
ances in citizens (Hooghe 2012; Kern et 
al. 2015). Although studies show that 
macro-economic factors obviously have 
an effect on protest participation, the 
moderating role of pre-existing institu-
tional arrangements, such as the type of 
welfare state, remains understudied.
The crisis has produced major eco-
nomic contractions and, above all, a 
decline in economic growth and an 
increase in unemployment rates (Gras-
so and Giugni 2016). Initial responses 
to the crisis were interventionist fiscal 
measures. From 2009, with the emer-
gence of the Greek debt crisis, Europe-
an institutions started to impose a set of 
austerity policies to its member states. 
Armingeon and Baccaro give a good 
overview of that process:
"Governments of different politi-
cal orientations, of different political 
strength and with different capabili-
ties for concertation with the social 
partners found themselves imple-
menting essentially the same structu-
ral adjustment program centred on 
public sector cuts, pension reform, 
easing of employment protection 
legislation, wakening of unemploy-
ment insurance, and flexibilization of 
collective bargaining" (2012: 182, in: 
Della Porta et al. 2017: 10).
These policy changes had an imme-
diate effect on citizens' lives whose so-
cio-economic situation degraded even 
further as policies targeted the core 
of the welfare state: unemployment 
benefits, pension systems, and labour 
legislation (Cinalli and Giugni 2016). 
The pre-existing welfare arrangements 
























































pect the same (if not increased) level 
of social protection from the new-
ly emerged economic uncertainty 
(Hemerijck 2013). Austerity measures 
lead to lower growth, higher unemploy-
ment, withered infrastructure, and more 
skewed distribution of income and life 
chances (Blyth 2013: 28).
The vested welfare arrangements 
are hard to change as they are the out-
comes of previously articulated organ-
ized interests and electoral preferences. 
In times of crisis, the welfare state faces 
trade-offs: resources are limited, and it 
has to be decided whose risks to prior-
itize (Pierson 1996; Hemerijck 2013). 
Specific welfare arrangements have tre-
mendous consequences for individuals 
and specific socio-economic groups. 
Notably, past and current welfare pref-
erences and expenditure levels limit 
alternative policymaking (Brooks and 
Manza 2007). They also shape citizens' 
preferences towards possible changes 
in existing social programmes (Pierson 
1996). Institutions can influence indi-
vidual behaviour because individuals 
form their opinion within particular 
institutional contexts of an already ex-
isting welfare state (Esping-Andersen 
1990). If welfare states shape individual 
behaviour, they can serve as a predictor 
for participation because "welfare states 
distribute and redistribute resources 
which enhance the chances average citi-
zens have to participate in political pro-
test (Quaranta 2016: 72)".
Regardless of the predictors that can 
explain the changes in levels of protest 
participation, it should be noted that 
collective actions form an inextricable 
part of politics in both prosperous times 
and in times of crisis. However, per-
haps it is plausible to assume that, due 
to the influence of the aforementioned 
predictors, the character of protest par-
ticipation will vary. Kerbo (1982) pre-
sented six differences between these 
movements. For movements of crisis 
to happen, the precondition is found in 
threatening political and/or socioeco-
nomic crisis, while movements of afflu-
ence happen in relatively stable periods. 
In movements of crisis, participants are 
oriented towards a specific movement, 
and they engage in collective action 
only if they are going to benefit direct-
ly from the fulfilment of their demands. 
In contrast, participants in movements 
of affluence are typically conscious of 
the different social issues they tend to 
address in their collective engagement. 
In terms of organization, movements of 
crisis are usually relatively unorganized 
and spontaneous, while movements of 
affluence begin with a social movement 
organization and a clear leadership 
structure. Due to that, usually in their 
early stages, movements of crisis tend 
to use a more violent repertoire and ex-
press more hostile outbursts towards au-
thorities, while movements of affluence 
use a more traditional protest repertoire. 
Finally, movements of affluence system-
atically use individual rewards and co-
ercion to promote active participation, 
while movements of crisis are not able 
to do so until (and if) they consolidate.
This paper aims to examine the said 
distinction between movements of cri-
sis, and movements of affluence, their 
participants, organizational structures 
and the repertoires they employ with-
in the Croatian context. In the absence 
of data on protests activity, it was im-
possible for scientists interested in this 
topic to empirically test Kerbo's theory. 
The data collected via PEA represents a 
ground-breaking opportunity to analyse 
the features of protest events in Croatia.
Taking Varieties of Capitalism 
and Welfare State into 
Account: The Croatian Case
The damaging effect of the crisis on pe-

























an axiom, but it has not been broadly 
recognized that it has had an even more 
disastrous effect on non-member coun-
tries that were deeply intertwined with 
Eurozone members (Bartlett and Prica 
2013). At the same time, the picture of 
the European periphery is not uniform. 
Despite the general demise of the eco-
nomy, some post-socialist countries 
have only stagnated in terms of econo-
mic growth or even maintained it positi-
ve during the crisis peak, while negative 
economic trends were recorded in seven 
countries, Croatia included. 9
With the memory of the period of 
deep economic contraction and political 
turmoil that had happened during the 
1990s still very vivid, after 2008 these 
countries had to confront a new phase 
of steep economic decline. Therefore, 
it is important to underline first the se-
verity of the economic recession that hit 
post-socialist Europe in the early 1990s. 
The economic situation was alarming 
already during the last days of socialism 
(Greskovits 1998). In the transition pe-
riod it was further exacerbated with the 
implementation of reforms which were 
encouraged or pressured by Western 
governments and international organi-
zations (Fidrmuc 2003) under assump-
tions that the same type of reform was 
applicable in all countries (Bohle and 
Greskovits 2012). Post-socialist coun-
tries experienced dramatic contractions 
of their economies. The transformation-
al recession was unexpectedly severe 
– cumulatively, output fell by between 
15% in the Czech Republic and 75% in 
Georgia (Fidrmuc 2003). In some coun-
9 Bulgaria, Romania, Czech Republic, and 
Russia stagnated in terms of economic 
growth, Albania, Belarus, Macedonia, 
Moldova, Poland, Serbia, and Slovakia 
managed to maintain it positive during 
the crisis peak. The negative economic 
trends were observed in Croatia, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, and 
Ukraine (Beissinger and Sasse 2014). 
tries, economic growth was further lim-
ited by military conflicts.
In this context, despite the relatively 
successful stabilization policies, imple-
mented by governments to tackle hy-
perinflation and to stabilize the curren-
cy, economic recovery was impossible 
(Stubbs and Zrinščak 2009). With the 
notable exception of the Visegrad coun-
tries10, post-socialist countries have had 
not reached the 1989 levels of GDP in the 
first decade of the transition (Fidrmuc 
2003). Bohle and Greskovits (2012) sug-
gest that the severity of the crisis was 
somehow expected in the countries that 
lacked institutional capacities to imple-
ment economic reforms. In these cases, 
governments conducted reforms based 
on patronage politics and implemented 
compensatory policies fused with na-
tionalism.
In the second part of 1990s and in 
the early 2000s, the perspective of EU 
membership became the driving force of 
further administrative, institutional and 
regulatory reforms aiming to depoliti-
cize policymaking by removing it from 
the realm of national decision making 
(Bohle and Greskovits 2012). The pros-
pect of European integration served also 
as a justification for unpopular deci-
sions. It legitimised neoliberal policies 
that were supposed to lead to mone-
tary stability and fiscal discipline, while 
promoting welfare state retrenchment. 
Political parties became nonresponsive 
to their electorate's preferences, and re-
sponsive to supranational institutions 
while trying to buy social peace, mostly 
by negotiating with labour unions and 
employers, promising rapid growth and 
stability upon EU accession (Bohle and 
Greskovits 2012).
10 Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slo-
vakia reached the 1989 level of GDP in the 

























































The described period of economic 
hardship, national states' poor capacity 
to respond to its challenges, and solu-
tions prescribed by the EU mirror the 
situation that the rest of Europe has seen 
after the 2008 crisis. However, with one 
notable distinction – Greskovits (1998) 
argued that in the 1990s Eastern Europe 
saw a period of demobilization because 
economic and political crisis affected 
the capacity necessary for collective 
action. Vanhuyse (2006) claimed that 
despite dramatic increases in poverty 
and inequality, and against theoretical 
assumptions, the transition period in 
post-socialist countries was astonish-
ingly peaceful. His explanation for the 
deficiency of contentious actions lied 
in the strategic use and compensatory 
nature of social policies which pacified 
considerable portions of the popula-
tion11.
Bohle and Greskovits (2012) claim 
that Croatia was a capable state when it 
became independent from Yugoslavia. 
However, the war and its aftermath, na-
tionalism and Tuđman's regime under-
mined the state's capacities, and Croatia 
failed to embrace neo-corporatism in 
the way Slovenia did. The country could 
not achieve economic growth, and mac-
roeconomic instabilities were recurring. 
Posts in the administration, judiciary, 
and in state-owned enterprises were 
filled with people loyal to the ruling par-
ty regardless of their competences. The 
privatization of state-owned companies 
followed the same logic. Social spend-
ing was extensive, but narrowly target-
ed one stratum: war veterans and their 
families (for details on the compensa-
tory nature of these policies see Begić 
and al. 2007; Dobrotić 2008; Stubbs and 
Zrinščak 2009; Dolenec 2017). Demo-
11 His analysis is based on cases of Poland, 
Hungary and the Czech Republic. Bohle 
and Greskovits (2012) show that similar 
conclusions are applicable for the other 
countries in CEE.
graphic renewal was proclaimed to be 
one of the main governmental goals. 
Therefore, spending on natality-orient-
ed family policies was substantive as 
well (for overview of family policy mak-
ing see Zrinščak and Puljiz 2002; Puljiz 
2008). Hrvatska demokratska zajednica 
(HDZ)12 used particular social policies 
to legitimise its governance. It did not 
engage in bargaining with the unions 
in the tripartite arena as these were per-
ceived as potentially strong mobilizers 
and political opponents. Towards the 
end of the 1990s, the unions started to 
behave in that way by challenging the 
crumbling Tuđman's regime (Bahtijari 
2001; Grdešić 2008; Bohle and Gresko-
vits 2012).
During the first decade of the 2000s, 
Croatia underwent a deep economic and 
democratic transformation. The 2000 
parliamentary elections marked the end 
of democratic transition as the rule of 
HDZ ended. A coalition of centre-left 
parties won the elections (Kasapović 
2001; Dolenec 2013; Henjak et al. 2013). 
Both economic and social indicators 
improved. However, integration into 
the global financial market unmasked 
external vulnerabilities of the economy. 
Foreign debt was on the rise, and house-
hold and corporate debts were in for-
eign currencies (Franičević 2011; Sanfey 
2011). The labour market structure re-
flected the distinction between workers 
on permanent contracts (usually em-
ployed in public services, protected by 
collective agreements and labour union 
membership) and those with temporary 
contracts, generally working in the grey 
economy and prone to numerous risks 
(Franičević 2011).
During the first several of months 
of 2008, the forecasts were optimistic. 
12 Croatian Democratic Union, the main cen-
tre-right political party that ruled Croatia 


























Macroeconomists thought the crisis 
would not hit Croatia due to macroeco-
nomic stability, increasing investments, 
stable political climate and the prospect 
of full EU membership in sight. GDP 
per capita reached a peak (see Figure 1). 
Dramatic change happened in the au-
tumn of 2008, when the significant drop 
in economic activity became obvious 
and started impacting other macroeco-
nomic variables. GDP growth rate hit 
rock bottom in the first quarter of 2009 
(Franičević 2011). In terms of societal 
impacts, the crisis prompted the citizens 
to renounce the idea that the country 
was slowly catching up with Western 
Europe and to accept that post-socialist 
countries, despite the intended conver-
gent EU policies, had never caught up 
with old member states (Musić 2013). 
The country was economically tied to 
the EU. Additionally, it needed to main-
tain political and social stability to be 
able to fulfil the strict pre-accession cri-
teria. Thus, any policy making aiming to 
tackle the crisis was profoundly limited 
by recommendations from European in-
stitutions.
None of the recommendations helped 
the economy recover. As seen in Figure 
1, GDP growth was negative for 6 con-
secutive years, from 2009 to 2014. The 
first signs of recovery were recorded as 
late as 2015. GDP per capita, in spite of 
gradual growth since 2015 onwards, has 
still not reached the 2008 level. These in-
dicators demonstrate that Croatia went 
through a period of deep and lasting 
economic crisis which led to a deteriora-
tion of living conditions, and, as a con-
sequence, impacted patterns of protest 
participation (Della Porta 2017). Taking 
the said into consideration, one should 
wonder how the decade of economic 
downfall affected protest participation 
in Croatia.
Against the backdrop of this politi-
cal-economic context, the next section 
offers an analysis of protest activity in 
the period 2000 to 2017. One should as-
sume that grievances which grew during 
the crisis would be articulated through 
protests. However, the national insti-
tutions' specificities and traditions are 
used to explain various protest features 
(McAdam 1986; Tarrow 1989; Kriesi et 
al. 1995; Kriesi 2004; Tilly and Tarrow 
2006). Existing welfare arrangements 
are hard to change since they represent 
outcomes of previously articulated or-
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None of the recommendations helped the economy recover. As seen in Figure 1, GDP 
growth was negative for 6 consecutive years, from 2009 to 2014. The first signs of recovery 
were recorded as late as 2015. GDP per capita, in spite of gradual growth since 2015 onwards, 
has still not reached the 2008 level. These indicators demonstrate that Croatia went through a 
period of deep and lasting economic crisis which led to a deterioration of living conditions, 
and, as a consequence, impacted patterns of protest participation (Della Porta 2017). Taking 
the said into consideration, one should wonder how the decade of economic downfall affected 
protest participation in Croatia. 
 
 
Figure 1. GDP Changes 1995-2018 (source World Bank, adapted by the author). 
 
Against the backdrop of this political-economic context, the next section offers an 
analysis of protest activity in the period 2000 to 2017. One should assume that grievances 
which grew during the crisis would be articulated through protests. However, the national 
institutions’ specificities and traditions are used to explain various protest features (McAdam 
1986; Tarrow 1989; Kriesi et al. 1995; Kriesi 2004; Tilly and Tarrow 2006). Existing welfare 
arrangements are hard to change since they represent outcomes of previously articulated 
organized interests and electoral preferences. In times of crisis resources are limited, and it 
has to be decided whose risks should be prioritized (Pierson 1996; Hemerijck 2013). Croatian 
social policy mak ng is described as “captured” (Stubbs and Zrinščak 2009) and 
“compensatory” (Begić and al. 2007; Dobrotić 2008; Stubbs and Zrinščak 2009; Dolenec 
2017), the mobilizing role of labour unions as moderate (Grdešić 2008), and a large share of 
the population as relying on clientelisti  rel tions with the state (Bohle and Greskovits 2012). 
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ganized interests and electoral prefer-
ences. In times of crisis resources are 
limited, and it has to be decided whose 
risks should be prioritized (Pierson 
1996; Hemerijck 2013). Croatian social 
policy making is described as "captured" 
(Stubbs and Zrinščak 2009) and "com-
pensatory" (Begić and al. 2007; Dobrotić 
2008; Stubbs and Zrinščak 2009; Dole-
nec 2017), the mobilizing role of labour 
unions as moderate (Grdešić 2008), and 
a large share of the population as rely-
ing on clientelistic relations with the 
state (Bohle and Greskovits 2012). Thus, 
it could have been expected that Croa-
tians would behave in the same way that 
Vanhuyse's (2006) analysis suggests – no 
matter how harsh the austerity meas-
ures, a significant share of the popula-
tion would remain pacified as long as 
there is no change in existing welfare ar-
rangements. If challengers of the status 
quo appeared, they should be younger 
people with temporary contracts, em-
ployed mostly in the grey economy and 
prone to numerous risks (Franičević 
2011) who are willing to raise awareness 
that not everyone in the society bears 
the consequences of economic hard-
ship equally (Giugni and Grasso 2016). 
However, as a large proportion of the 
younger unemployed cohort emigrated 
from Croatia with the first signs of eco-
nomic decline (Župarić-Iljić 2016), this 
probably affected the levels of protest ac-
tivities, making them significantly lower 
than in other European countries.13
Additionally, as the observed period 
encompasses both periods of economic 
growth and periods of economic crisis, 
this enables us to analyse Kerbo's theses 
about the characteristics of protest activ-
ities in periods of crisis and periods of af-
fluence (Kerbo 1982). It is expected that 
13 See O'Connor in Della Porta (2017) on 
the effects of emigration for the austerity 
related protest in Ireland, and Bohle and 
Greskovits (2012) in Baltic countries, Hun-
gary and Poland.
in movements of crisis, people are more 
engaged in unorganized and spontane-
ous collective action, and that they par-
ticipate only if they directly benefit from 
the action, without having a tendency 
to actively participate in the movement 
for a longer period. They would also be 
more likely to resort to a more violent 
repertoire and express more hostile out-
bursts towards the authorities.
Results and Discussion
Given that the newly collected data that 
has never before been available for Cro-
atia is presented here, before exploring 
the main thesis of this paper we shall 
look into the main trends in the given 
period. Although there is no consensus 
on the most efficient way to measure 
changes in protest actions, two vari-
ables have been used: the number of 
events and the number of participants 
in all recorded protest events (Beissing-
er and Sasse 2014; Biggs 2018).14 Early 
studies assumed a high positive corre-
lation between the frequency of protest 
events and the total number of partici-
pants. However, these studies show that 
correlation is, in fact, low or, at best, 
moderate, meaning that the choice be-
tween counting events and counting 
participants will drastically affect the 
prospective conclusions (Biggs 2018). 
Overall 2,806 protests and 1,713,435 
participants15 were recorded in Croatia 
14 Beissinger and Sasse in their analysis use a 
third variable, the total number of protest 
days. This measure is more useful for com-
parative studies, and therefore is not used 
in the presented analysis.
15 Ekiert and Kubik (1998) showed that the 
main problem for scholars using PEA data 
is the high frequency of missing values for 
the "number of participants" variable. The 
same is applicable here: In 1010 cases, or 
37% of all recorded events, the exact num-
ber of participants was not reported. An 
additional obstacle to acquiring the most 
possibly accurate total number of partic-

























in the covered period. The number of 
participants in the observed period 
means that on average 2.2% of the popu-
lation was mobilised in different protest 
activities. The PEA dataset enables us 
to compare this level of mobilization to 
those observed in Serbian, Spanish and 
Portuguese cases. As national censuses 
were conducted in all four countries in 
2011, the size of the population from 
the census data was used for weighting.16 
In both Croatia and Serbia, around 2% 
of the total population participated in 
protest events over the entire observed 
period, both before and after 2008.17 In 
Portugal and Spain, the average level of 
participation is higher, 7.63% and 8.22% 
respectively.18
newspapers customarily report estimates 
delivered by the organizers, the police (or 
other authorities) and the reporters. These 
numbers often vary significantly and some-
times reflect a tendency of the organizers to 
inflate the numbers and of the authorities 
to diminish the credibility of the stated 
demands by lowering the numbers. Some-
times the reported estimates mirror edi-
torial politics. Coders were instructed to 
gather all reported numbers. The most con-
servative estimate was used for the analysis. 
16 The recorded population in Croatia was 
4,284,889 people, in Portugal 10,562,178, 
in Serbia 7,186,862, and in Spain 46,815,916.
17 2000 and 2001 represent outliers in the Ser-
bian case – almost 30% of citizens partic-
ipated in two general strikes and protests 
related to October 5 (Dolenec et al. 2019).
18 In Portugal and Spain, mobilization levels 
seem to correspond to particular cycles of 
contention. The highest level of mobiliza-
tion in Portugal, 33% of population, was 
recorded during the first wave of anti-aus-
terity protests. In Spain, it surpassed 20% of 
the total population only in 2003 and 2004 
during protests against the war in Iraq, and 
in the aftermath of the terrorist attack in 
Madrid. The anti-austerity protest cycle 
managed to maintain the level of mobili-
zation over 5% for four consecutive years, 
reaching its peak in 2013. In the post-crisis 
period, the level of mobilization in Portu-
gal dropped below the one in Croatia and 
Serbia. In 2017 all countries, apart from 
Figure 2 shows that the highest num-
ber of protests was recorded in 2000 
and 2001. Strikes represent the larg-
est share of recorded protest events in 
these two years. This period was deeply 
marked by workers' mobilizations and 
dissatisfaction with the consequences 
of the political and economic changes 
in the 1990s. Due to data limitations it 
is difficult to assess if they represent a 
continuation of mobilizations from the 
late 1990s (Grdešić 2008), though pro-
testors' demands show that their nature 
is unaltered. They demand a revision of 
the privatization processes and payment 
of unpaid wages and/or severance pay, 
while simultaneously examining the 
role of previous and incumbent govern-
ments in shielding those responsible for 
criminal activities during the period of 
privatization. At the same time, veter-
ans' associations organised numerous 
multi-local demonstrations to condemn 
the government's cooperation with the 
Hague Tribunal.
Starting from 2003, economic and so-
cial indicators started to improve, and 
political parties, employers, labour un-
ions and civil society came to a consen-
sus that achieving European integration 
should be the main priority. The relative 
economic and social stability was re-
flected in the decline of protest activi-
ties. From 2003 to 2007 a rather invari-
able trend in both the number of events 
and participants is observed. The high 
number of participants in 2004 repre-
sents the only outlier but can mostly be 
explained by a several days' long strike 
in public services.19 The same can be 
Spain, recorded low levels of mobilization. 
The level of mobilization in Spain has risen 
again, mainly due to the Catalan independ-
ence movement (Dolenec et al. 2019).
19 As official reports on the numbers of strik-
ers are non-existent in Croatia, media out-
lets usually report numbers provided by 
unions. There is a possibility that the num-
























































said of the number of participants in 
2008 which represents the highest an-
nual number of protest participants in 
the dataset. The labour unions of public 
sector employees organized a massive 
protest in Zagreb demanding a "radical 
change in economic and social policies" 
that was attended by more than 50,000 
participants. This finding is in line with 
the existing notion in literature which 
claims that strikes tend to be more fre-
quent when economies are expanding 
rather than contracting. In tough times 
workers' jobs are at the mercy of employ-
ers, and workers have greater difficulty 
withholding labour when their jobs are 
under threat (Tilly and Shorter 1974; 
Hibbs 1976, as quoted in: Beissinger and 
Sasse 2014).
The year 2011 marked the beginning of 
protests organized by citizen initiatives 
which could be regarded as anti-aus-
The implications for analysis are obvious 
– In years when multi-sector, multi-day or 
general strikes are recorded, an overesti-
mated number of participants is plausible. 
terity protests similar to those in Spain 
and Portugal. This period is described 
in depth later in the paper. In 2012 and 
2013 ideological divisions between the 
progressive left and the traditional right 
became prominent and mobilized over 
100,000 people during that period. The 
final rise in the number of participants 
reflects two large protests advocating for 
school curriculum reform: one in 2016, 
and the second one in 2017.
In the observed period, protests ad-
dressing demands related to economic 
protest represented a large share of all 
reported events. In this analysis, eco-
nomic protest refers to protests where 
participants formulated one or more de-
mands regarding cuts to public servic-
es, austerity, inequality, unemployment, 
dismissals, redundancy procedures, 
salary cuts, precarity, debt, housing cri-
sis and price increase.20 Although they 
20 Demands for analysis were selected based on 
definition of austerity measures Leventi et 
al. (2010) provided. As austerity measures/
policies in some countries represent explicit 
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Figure 2 shows that the highest number of protests was recorded in 2000 and 2001. Strikes 
represent the largest share of recorded protest events in these two years. This period was 
deeply marked by workers’ mobilizations and dissatisfaction with the consequences of the 
political and economic changes in the 1990s. Due to data limitations it is difficult to assess if 
they represent a continuation of mobilizations from the late 1990s (Grdešić 2008), though 
protestors’ demands show that their nature is unaltered. They demand a revision of the 
privatization processes and payment of unpaid wages and/or severance pay, while 
simultaneously examining the role of previous and incumbent governments in shielding those 
responsible for criminal activities during the period of privatization. At the same time, 
veterans’ associations organised numerous multi-local demonstrations to condemn the 
government’s cooperation with the Hague Tribunal.  
  
Figure 2. Number of protest events and participants in Croatia, 2000-2017. 
Starting from 2003, economic and social indicators started to improve, and political 
parties, employers, labour unions and civil society came to a consensus that achieving 
European integration should be the main priority. The relative economic and social stability 
was reflected in the decline of protest activities. From 2003 to 2007 a rather invariable trend 
in both the number of events and participants is observed. The high number of participants in 
2004 represents the only outlier but can mostly be explained by a several days’ l ng strike in 


























also represent materialistic demands of 
sorts, workers' rights related demands 
have been included in the analysis but 
separately according to the logic that 
they represent the "old" type of labour 
contention as opposed to newer crisis 
related demands (Dolenec et al. 2019).
From Figure 3 it can be observed that 
both types of demands were primarily 
represented in the dataset in the early 
2000s. They remained important during 
the rest of the observed period, peaking 
in 2012. Figure 3 also shows the num-
ber of protests where demands against 
corruption and clientelism were articu-
lated. Presence of these demands in the 
early 2000s can be related to the ques-
packages of reforms, while in others, they 
cannot be identified as whole packages, it 
is necessary to list policy changes which 
can be defined as austerity measures: "… 
[they] take the form of some combination 
of: (i) reductions in cash benefits (and pub-
lic pensions); (ii) increases in direct taxes 
and contributions; (iii) increases in indirect 
taxes; (iv) reductions in public services that 
have an indirect impact on the welfare of 
households using them; (v) reductions in 
public expenditure that cannot be allocated 
to households (e.g. pure public goods like 
defence spending) and increases in taxes 
that are not straightforward to allocate to 
households; (vi) cuts in public sector pay 
(vii) cuts in public sector employment (Lev-
enti et al. 2010: 7).
tioning of the role of political elites in 
the period of privatization. Later in that 
period, they reflect growing distrust in 
the government and other institutions.
In 2009 the government introduced 
new taxation, raised the rate of val-
ue-added tax, cut spending in ministries 
and state companies, and revoked free 
transportation and textbooks for pupils 
(Franičević 2011). Labour unions led 
protests against these measures, high-
lighting that they were immoral and 
inadequate responses to the econom-
ic situation. At the same time, workers 
and farmers rebelled against the state's 
tendency to halt subsidies and to pri-
vatize the last remaining state-owned 
companies. All these protests reflect the 
high number of economic protest and 
workers' rights protests in 2009 as seen 
in Figure 3. Workers' protests became 
predominant once again in 2012, with 
strikes in textile and metal industries. 
Public employees held a one-day strike 
with over 70,000 people participating. 
Although protest activities organized 
by labour unions were visible during 
the crisis, they were relatively low when 
compared to the beginning of the 2000s. 
The data shows that the level of mobi-
lization due to workers' rights and eco-
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period, peaking in 2012.  Figure 3 also shows the number of protests where demands against 
corruption and clientelism were articulated. Presence of these demands in the early 2000s can 
be related to the questioning of the role of political elites in the period of privatization. Later 
in that period, they reflect growing distrust in the government and other institutions.  
 
Figure 3. Crisis related demands vs. other demands 
 
In 2009 the government introduced new taxation, raised the rate of value-added tax, cut 
spending in minist ies and stat  companies, an  revoked free transpo tation nd textbooks for 
pupils (Franičević 2011). Labour unions led protests against these measures, highlighting that 
they were immoral and inadequate responses to the economic situation. At the same time, 
workers and farmers rebelled against the state’s tendency to halt subsidies and to privatize the 
last remaining state-owned companies. All these protests reflec  the high number of econ mic 
protest and workers’ rights protests in 2009 as seen in Figure 3. Workers’ protests became 
predominant once again in 2012, with strikes in textile and metal industries. Public employees 
held a one-day strike with over 70,000 people participating. Although protest activities 
organized by labour unions were visible during the crisis, they were relatively low when 
compared to the beginning f t e 2000s. The data shows that the level of mobilization due to 
workers’ rights and economic protests has been in decline ever since.  
The 2009 student movement addressed problems of commercialization of higher 
education (Dolenec and Doolan 2013). Students occupied the universities, and organized 
marches and sit-ins where they were joined by other citizens: parents, workers, professors, 
and activists. The government seemed to be aware of the mobilization potential the stud nts 
had. Balković (2014) showed that Croatians prioritized governmental spending on public 
























































nomic protests has been in decline ever 
since.
The 2009 student movement ad-
dressed problems of commercialization 
of higher education (Dolenec and Dool-
an 2013). Students occupied the univer-
sities, and organized marches and sit-ins 
where they were joined by other citi-
zens: parents, workers, professors, and 
activists. The government seemed to be 
aware of the mobilization potential the 
students had. Balković (2014) showed 
that Croatians prioritized governmental 
spending on public education over other 
types of social spending. If citizens as-
sumed that cuts were going to affect the 
part of welfare state which they cared 
most about, they would be likely to en-
gage in contentious actions to defend the 
existing arrangements. Thus, it can be 
said that the government wanted to pre-
vent student protests from spreading to 
broader social groups whose discontent 
would be triggered by cuts in the sector 
that everyone benefited from once dur-
ing their lifetime. By fulfilling the most 
important student demands, the gov-
ernment used a very well documented 
tactic to pacify a rebellious portion of 
society, and possibly prevented bursts 
of broader dissatisfaction. The main 
slogans the movement was using were 
"One World, One Struggle" and "Knowl-
edge is not a Commodity" which related 
specific problems within Croatian high-
er education with universal topics such 
as lack of "real" democracy, inequality 
of chances, and corruption of the domi-
nant neoliberal system. Štiks and Horvat 
(2014) see this movement as the first po-
litical opposition to governmental poli-
cies, but also to the dominant political, 
economic, and social regime. Insights 
from PEA data about the nature of the 
movement confirm Štiks and Horvat's 
(2014) argument that it could be inter-
preted as an anti-austerity one.
From 2009 to 2011 "The Right to the 
City" movement opposed a develop-
mental project in downtown Zagreb. 
Protestors used the most diverse reper-
toire of action that social movements in 
Croatia had used ever before, ranging 
from demonstrations, occupations, sit-
ins to symbolic and theatrical perfor-
mances. Dolenec et al. (2017) note that 
this broad range of action repertoire, 
especially public space occupation, pre-
dates similar strategies used in the In-
dignados protests and in the "Occupy" 
movements. As student protests, the 
movement managed to relate particular 
problems concerning the protection of 
urban space with universal topics such 
as political unresponsiveness, violated 
democratic practices, and opposition 
to neoliberalism (Dolenec, Kralj and 
Balković 2019). Additionally, the move-
ment represented an important instance 
of cooperation between environmental 
organizations, organizations from the 
independent cultural scene, student or-
ganizations, unions, workers and grass-
roots initiatives whose cooperation has 
evolved and grown in capacity since 
2000 (Dolenec et al. 2017),eventually 
leading to the establishment of a po-
litical party called "Zagreb je naš" (Za-
greb is Ours). The party formed a coa-
lition with smaller left-wing parties and 
competed in mayoral and city assembly 
elections managing to gain 4 seats in the 
City Assembly only 3 months following 
its formation (Dolenec, Kralj and Balk-
ović 2019).
The year 2011 marked the beginning 
of protests organized by citizen initia-
tives which share some features of an-
ti-austerity protests that occurred in 
Spain or Portugal. The government had 
passed a harsh programme of econom-
ic recovery in 2010. However, the 2011 
wave of discontent started only with 
protests of war veterans, rightist organ-

























government and its policies – including 
those aimed at tackling the effects of the 
crisis. Their demands were not commu-
nicated clearly, and it seemed as if they 
were only questioning the HDZ govern-
ment's capacity to govern. Dolenec and 
Širinić (2020, forthcoming) showed that 
when HDZ is in the office, veterans co-
operate with the state and mobilize only 
to strengthen its legitimacy and weaken 
the opposition. In that sense, this mo-
bilization represented a departure from 
known protest patterns. These protests 
were an introduction to a sequence of 
events organized by the citizen initia-
tive which managed to communicate 
their grievances in a more comprehen-
sive way. Because they were the first to 
rely on Facebook to mobilize people, the 
protests became known as the Facebook 
protests. In months to follow they or-
ganized fourteen marches through Za-
greb, as well as demonstrations in vari-
ous cities. Although the Facebook group 
had almost 50,000 members, the num-
ber of citizens who attended marches 
and related events varied significantly 
on a daily basis. The highest recorded 
number of participants – over 20,000 of 
them – was recorded during the protest 
held on March 5th.
In their marches, the protesters went 
visiting governmental institutions, 
headquarters of the main political par-
ties, and banks, but also politicians' 
homes where they would either bang 
pots or just shout to disturb members of 
politicians' households – both strategies 
that were also used in the Spanish an-
ti-austerity protests. PEA data provides 
no grounds for conclusions on who the 
participants were. Media reports mainly 
labelled them as "unsatisfied citizens". 
It is however clear that an extremely di-
verse group of citizens protested. Their 
allies kept changing from one march to 
another. Some marches were support-
ed by the biggest labour unions, while 
in some others labour unions were the 
direct target of the protest, blamed for 
treason for collaborating with the gov-
ernment. Protesters addressed the eco-
nomic and the social situation, express-
ing distrust in media, and national and 
supra-national institutions while indi-
cating dissatisfaction with the dominant 
capitalist system and social inequality it 
produces. As predicted, they were pro-
testing against the high levels of corrup-
tion and clientelism. There were calls 
for the restoration of "moral principles" 
and "traditional values". The same "love-
hate" relationship that the protesters 
had with the labour unions, they had 
with the Catholic Church. On sever-
al occasions they expressed distrust in 
the Church, while on other occasions 
the leftist participants had quarrels with 
the right-wing ones over the presence of 
religious symbols. The general anti-EU 
feeling was omnipresent, but again, dif-
ferent views were clashing: some partic-
ipants were strongly against Croatia en-
tering the EU, while others were pro-EU 
but did not agree with the solutions that 
the EU offered during the crisis. The ini-
tiative did not have a clear organization-
al structure, though some individuals 
tried to position themselves as leaders. 
However, the participants did not sup-
port that endeavour, so nobody official-
ly directed the future course of action. 
That led to a gradual disintegration of 
protests. In the years following these 
protests some of the actors involved in 
their organization became prominent 
political actors.
Already that same April, the initiator 
of the protests, Ivan Pernar, established 
a political party – at the time called Al-
liance for Change (Savez za promjene) 
and announced that it would participate 
in the upcoming parliamentary elec-
tion. Elections were held in December 
2011. Pernar's party did not achieve any 
























































ally started to rise due to the party ac-
tivists' well-mediatized participation in 
anti-eviction activism which led to the 
party's rebranding as Human Shield 
(Živi zid) in August 2014. In spite of un-
favourable economic conditions, bigger 
protests related to the economic griev-
ances. Rather it can be said that the peri-
od of post-materialist, new social move-
ments (Della Porta 2015) had begun. 
In 2012 and 2013 ideological divisions 
between the progressive left and the tra-
ditional right became very prominent, 
and topics such as same-sex marriage, 
the Concordat with the Vatican, minor-
ity rights, and politics of memory dom-
inated the public sphere. The protest 
arena was no longer used dominantly 
by actors from the left. Organizations 
such as In the Name of the Family (U 
ime obitelji), numerous veteran organi-
zations, and Circle for the Square (Krug 
za trg) were leading the mobilization on 
the right. The same trend continued in 
2014 and 2015, with war veteran acam-
pada on the premises of the Ministry of 
Veterans Affairs. It lasted for 555 days, 
becoming the longest protest recorded 
in recent Croatian history. Veterans de-
manded the resignation of the Minister, 
as well as an expansion of their benefits 
because the social democratic govern-
ment tried to cut the existing ones. As 
both presidential and parliamentary 
elections were held during the acampa-
da, the protestors openly favoured HDZ 
candidates. They withdrew from the 
Ministry's premises only after the HDZ 
won the 2015 parliamentary election.
These presidential and parliamen-
tary elections were marked by unfore-
seen success of the Human Shield. One 
of their most renowned activists, Ivan 
Vilibor Sinčić, had announced he would 
run for president. Despite entering the 
race as an underdog, he placed third 
in the first round. This venture and the 
anti-eviction activities led to nation-
al recognition for the party which was 
reflected in the 2015 election. The party 
secured one parliamentary seat. In the 
2016 snap election, the Human Shield 
formed a coalition with several oth-
er actors and won 8 seats. The success 
signalized that the party had become a 
relevant political actor that had under-
gone transformation from an activist 
organization to a political party. In that 
sense it can be regarded as one of the 
new parties – such as Podemos in Spain 
– that have emerged after the crisis and 
disrupted the existing party system by 
taking a significant portion of voters 
from multiple parties.
Conclusion
Due to a lack of data, neither the Croa-
tian cycle of anti-austerity protests nor 
protest dynamics in general have been 
studied systematically. Using original 
data, this paper aimed to explore if an 
austerity-fuelled cycle of contention did 
occur in Croatia.
By giving an overview of protest activ-
ities in Croatia in the last two decades, 
it showed that national varieties of cap-
italism influenced patterns of protest 
participation in a given country. The 
dynamics of contention in Croatia has 
been influenced by long-term effects of 
the so-called ‘transition period' from the 
early 1990s. The opportunity to chal-
lenge the existing political alignments 
during the short period of econom-
ic growth and political stability in the 
early 2000s did not arise. The findings 
from PEA data are in line with theories 
claiming that the national institutions' 
specificities serve as predictors of pro-
test dynamics. The analysis confirmed 
Vanhuyse's (2006) findings: a large pro-
portion of the population remained pac-
ified throughout these 18 years due to 
captured and compensatory social pol-
icy making. Broad social groups, such as 

























the state, and protest only when they 
feel their benefits are endangered, usu-
ally when social democrats are in power. 
At the same time, the beginning of the 
2000s was marked by workers' mobili-
zations and dissatisfaction with the con-
sequences of the political and economic 
changes in the 1990s. Only later in the 
2000s, in times of relative economic sta-
bility, did the labour unions advocate 
for better working conditions and start 
questioning policy changes. That being 
said, workers' protests can be seen as the 
only outlier in the usually obedient pro-
test arena in the first part of the 2000s.
Second, based on our knowledge of 
the protests in the 1990s and in the years 
preceding the crisis, it could have been 
be assumed that no matter how harsh the 
austerity measures, a significant share of 
the population would remain pacified 
as long as there is no change in existing 
welfare arrangements. Nevertheless, in 
the aftermath of the 2008 crisis chal-
lengers of the status quo did appear and 
it can be said that the post-2008 wave 
of contention in Croatia does exist. The 
analysis showed that protests directly 
addressing austerity measures have in-
deed taken place, starting with the stu-
dent protests, and culminating with the 
Facebook protests in 2011. The student 
protests and "The Right to the City" 
movement managed to connect specif-
ic grievances with universal ones. They 
addressed the democratic deficit and 
corrupt dominant neoliberal system and 
the social inequalities it accentuates and 
perpetuates. They preceded the Face-
book protests in formulating and ex-
pressing socio-economic grievances and 
articulated an anti-systemic sentiment 
by criticizing neoliberalism and auster-
ity. Due to their strong organizational 
structure and abundance of resources 
in terms of participation and activists' 
"know-how", these movements resem-
ble Kerbo's (1982) movements of afflu-
ence. On the other hand, the Facebook 
protests lacked organizational structure 
and continuous engagement. They were 
motivated mainly by the general dis-
satisfaction with corrupted elites and a 
sense of not being represented. In that 
sense, they can be seen as corresponding 
to Kerbo's (1982) movements of crisis. 
That common feeling of dissatisfaction 
brought together people of different ide-
ological backgrounds, which prevented 
the movement's persistence and more 
cohesive demands making. Additional-
ly, the Facebook protests lacked resourc-
es and organizations which would help 
them to articulate grievances. However, 
the protests have left an important mark 
on the Croatian political system – they 
had helped some of their initiators to 
establish an anti-system political party 
that would gain significant electoral suc-
cess in just a few years' time.
In a nutshell, the post-2008 wave of 
contention was not only fuelled by the 
crisis and the austerity measures that en-
sued, but also by socio-economic griev-
ances that had accumulated in preced-
ing periods, but which were omitted 
from the political mainstream due to the 
lack of actors and possibilities to repre-
sent them. Any further analysis would 
need to address the content and inten-
tions of the proposed and implemented 
austerity policies and connect these with 
particular protest events recorded in the 
PEA dataset. This would enable exhaus-
tive process tracing and give provide a 
deeper understanding of the nature of 
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Val osporavanja potaknut politikom  
štednje – mit ili stvarnost?
Sažetak Rijetke su analize prosvjedne dinamike u hrvatskoj, djelomice zato što se 
dosad nije mogla analizirati sustavno. oslanjajući se na nove podatke o prosvjed-
nim događajima od 2000. do 2017, ovaj rad opisuje glavne trendove i dinamiku 
prosvjednih aktivnosti u hrvatskoj u tom razdoblju. Rad preispituje tezu Beissinge-
ra i sasse o nepostojanju prosvjeda protiv politike štednje u hrvatskoj nakon 2008. 
unatoč tome što su prosvjedi koji su se izravno ticali politike štednje bili relativno 
rijetki, ako se uzorak prosvjednih događaja proširi na prosvjede koji su zahtijeva-
li besplatno javno školstvo, zagovarali prava radnika i borili se za pravo na grad, 
onda je upitan stav o "tišini" u hrvatskoj. ovaj rad kani povezati dio prosvjedne 
dinamike s Kerbovom razlikom između pokretâ u vremenima krize i obilja. usre-
dotočujući se na razdoblje od studenskih prosvjeda 2008. do Facebook-prosvje-
da 2011, rad pokazuje da su studentski pokret i pokret "Pravo na grad" prethodili 
 Facebook-prosvjedima u formuliranju i izražavanju socijalno-ekonomskih zahtjeva 
te artikuliranju antisistemskih osjećaja. Zahvaljujući snažnoj organizacijskoj struk-
turi i resursima aktivista, ti su pokreti nalikovali na Kerbove pokrete u vrijeme obilja. 
istodobno, Facebook-prosvjedima nedostajali su organizacijska struktura i kontinu-
irano sudjelovanje građana te odgovaraju pokretima u doba krize.
Ključne riječi hrvatska, analiza prosvjednih događaja, prosvjedna dinamika, pro-
svjedi protiv politike štednje
